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A Circuit Split Involving Ten Federal
Circuits: Why Copyright Infringement
Actions Should Be Allowed to Proceed After
an Application for a Copyright is Filed
MORGAN L. JOHNSON*
In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick addressed the subject matter jurisdiction of a trademark infringement
claim. Not only did this avoid the larger question of when a trademark is
“registered” under § 411(a), but it lead to further division among the circuit courts. Section 411(a) sets forth the requirements for a trademark infringement suit to be filed; most importantly that it must be “registered.”
The registration approach has determined that a trademark is only registered when a party receives an affirmative or negative response, directly
from the Copyright Office. The application approach, however, finds the
trademark to be “registered” whenever the application has been submitted,
along with the accompanying fees and forms.
Since the Reed Elsevier case, four more federal circuits have been
forced to decide when a trademark is registered. This has led to a five-tofive circuit split regarding the two approaches. This note determines that
the application approach is the appropriate interpretation of the registration requirement. This will be shown through: (II) a brief description of the
opposing viewpoints, (III) the reasoning for the registration approach, (IV)
the reasoning for the application approach, and finally (V) why the application approach is superior to the registration approach. Finally, this articles
calls upon the Supreme Court to finally decide the issue of registration, so
as to clarify at least one aspect of trademark rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine creating a copyrightable work, submitting the application to
the Copyright Office, and knowing the copyright will be granted as soon as
an agent reviews the application. Meanwhile, you have to helplessly watch
as others infringe your work for years. In addition to defenselessly watching
others infringe your work, you must cross your fingers and hope that the
Copyright Office makes a final decision within three years of submitting
your application. If your copyright is not granted within the three years, you
may never be able to recover for the infringement. The damages resulting
from a person willfully infringing your creations would forever be outside
of your grasp. Unfortunately, the current split among the federal circuits
creates just this situation in over half of the circuits.
A three-year statute of limitations on copyright infringement claims
brought under Chapter 17 of the United States Code presents this very real
issue in copyright law today.1 In an era of ever increasing intellectual property and copyrighted material, and with current backlogs of up to eight
months before receiving an actual decision from the Copyright Office,2 it is
foreseeable that in the near future the three-year statute of limitations could
1.
17 U.S.C.A. § 507 (LexisNexis 1998); see Lego A/S v. Best-Lock Constr. Toys,
Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Conn. 2012).
2.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, I’ve Submitted My Application, Fee, and Copy of My
Work to the Copyright Office. Now What?, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faqwhat.html# (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
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be a serious bar to a person seeking to protect their copyrightable material.3
This has the potential to be further exacerbated by issues within the government itself.4
There are two prevalent interpretations of 17 U.S.C. § 411 (the institution of a civil copyright infringement case), which lead to different conclusions as to what is the appropriate point in time to file a claim for copyright
infringement. Central to this debate is the presence of a sharp divide between the federal circuit courts, with an equal number of circuits supporting
each approach. The differences between these two interpretations will be
discussed in further detail in parts III and IV of this Article, but the two
approaches are generally referred to as the application approach and the
registration approach.5 The division among these approaches has led to at
least five circuits (or district courts within those circuits) adopting the application approach,6 and at least five adopting the registration approach.7
3.
See Nathan R. Curtis, Note, Statutory Cosmetic Surgery: Misinterpretation of
the Copyright Act's Registration Requirement in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 2011 BYU L. REV. 83, 83 (2011).
4.
Due to the government shutdown (lapse in government funding) in October of
2013, the Copyright Office was closed for fourteen days. A notice on the Copyright Office
homepage stated that submissions would not be reviewed or processed until the office reopened. Potentials for government shutdown or interruptions add further delay to the potential
eight month waiting period to receiving a certificate of copyright registration. The notice that
was present in 2013 read:
Due to the lapse in government funding, the U.S. Copyright
Office is closed, as is the greater Library of Congress. As such,
the office is unable to update the information on this website,
respond to inquiries, or process transactions. Registration
submissions will be accepted for the purpose of securing date
of receipt, but will not be processed. Website updates and all
normal business activity will resume when the government reopens.
If you would like to file a copyright registration online, the
online registration system is available. Filing your claim now
will help ensure the earliest possible effective date of registration, although copyright registrations will not be processed until the Copyright Office reopens.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
5.
Compound Stock Earnings Seminars, Inc. v. Dannenberg, No. 3:10CV2201D,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1014 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012).
6.
See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir.
2010); Apple Barrel Prods. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984); Panoramic Stock Images,
Ltd. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 961 F. Supp. 918, (N.D. Ill. 2013); Alicea v. Machete Music,
No. 10-CV-30002-MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2012); Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D. N.C. 2004).
7.
See La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th
Cir. 2005); M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990); N.J.
Media Grp., Inc. v. Sasson, No. 2:12-3568(WJM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1536 (D.N.J. Jan.
4, 2013); Hawaiian Vill. Computer, Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partners, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 951
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The main argument regarding § 411 centers around § 411(a), which
states that a person cannot file a civil action for infringement of a copyright
until there is preregistration or registration of the copyright in accordance
with the Copyright Act.8 While this may seem straightforward, the federal
circuits are split over the meaning of “registration” within this statute.9 The
registration approach interprets § 411 to mean that a copyright is only “registered” when the party receives an affirmative or negative response from
the Copyright Office,10 while the application approach interprets § 411 to
mean that, for purposes of a copyright infringement claim, a copyright is
“registered” when an application has been submitted (accompanied by the
appropriate fees and forms).11
This Article agrees with the five federal circuits that have come to the
conclusion that the application approach is the correct interpretation of §
411. Registration, such that an owner may protect their copyrightable material through infringement actions, is affected upon submission of the application and accompanying documents to the Copyright Office. In addition to
this, this Article recognizes that within the last several years, and since the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Reed Elsevier,12 many more circuits have been
forced to choose which approach to adopt. Post-Reed Elsevier, many more
(E.D. Mich. 2007); TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06CV00697JCH, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 71240 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
8.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (LexisNexis 2008). Section 411(a) in full
reads:
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the
author under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of
subsection (b), no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the
deposit, application, and fee required for registration have
been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a
civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of
the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. The
Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action
with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim
by entering an appearance within sixty days after such service,
but the Register's failure to become a party shall not deprive
the court of jurisdiction to determine that issue.
9.
Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 564 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2009).
10.
N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Sasson, No. 2:12-3568(WJM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1536 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2013).
11.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 615.
12.
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) was a 2010 opinion by
the United States Supreme Court which addressed the jurisdictional requirements to hear a §
411 copyright infringement case. The implications of this decision, and how it changed the
discussion of § 411 will be addressed in Section II.
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courts have chosen to subscribe to the interpretation of the application approach over that of the registration approach.
What follows will be an overview of how the application and registration approaches have developed over the years and a discussion of the circuits (or district courts within each circuit) who have adopted each approach. Included in this background will be a detailed discussion of each
approach, found in part III and IV, especially focused on the views of the
four most recent circuit courts to have adopted their respective approaches
in the last three years. The Article will then conclude in part V with a discussion of why the application approach is the correct statutory interpretation.

II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Chapter twenty-eight of the United States Code grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over copyright claims to the federal district courts.13
The first issue that arose within these district courts, with respect to § 411,
was whether the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction over copyright infringement claims, for copyrights that had yet to receive formal approval from the Copyright Office.14 The original split between the circuits
was at what point a party had a recognizable claim under § 411, such that
the district court possessed jurisdiction to hear the infringement claim.15
Under the registration approach, no lawsuit for copyright infringement may
be brought until an affirmative or negative ruling on the copyright is received. Under the application approach, no lawsuit may be brought until the
application for the copyright is submitted. This issue remained unaddressed
by the Supreme Court until 2010.
The Supreme Court finally looked to address this split between the circuits in their 2010 decision of Reed Elsevier.16 One question reviewed by
the Court was whether a copyright was registered such that a federal court
would have jurisdiction to decide a case of infringement.17 While the Court
avoided the larger issue of the circuit split between the application and registration approaches mentioned previously, it clarified that the issue is not
one of jurisdiction.18 The Supreme Court held that the federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear an infringement case, even if the item has

13.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (LexisNexis 2011).
14.
Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154; see La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel
Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005).
15.
Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 159; see La Resolana, 416 F.3d 1195.
16.
Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 159-60.
17.
Id. at 163.
18.
Id. at 164.

66

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 6

not been “registered” as required by § 411(a).19 While this would seem to
resolve the issues between the two approaches, after the 2010 decision of
Reed Elsevier the contemporary issue has become whether the court’s interpretation of “registered” means that a copyright infringement case can
withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.20 The split between the circuits regarding the registration and application approaches
essentially remained undisturbed, with the minor difference being that
courts now evaluate each approach for purposes of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, as opposed to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.21 The courts now have jurisdiction simply to determine
if an infringement action is registered, such that there is a legitimate claim
for infringement, and the case may move forward. Because the opinion did
little to change the debate, circuits which had previously adopted either the
registration or application approach have simply reaffirmed their belief in
their respective approach post-Reed Elsevier.22

III. THE REGISTRATION APPROACH
The registration approach posits that a claim for copyright infringement may only be brought upon an affirmative or negative decision from
the Copyright Office of the application for a copyright.23 While some of the
courts that follow this approach have suggested that the plaintiff must have
a physical copy of the grant or denial of the copyright to file a claim,24 the
consensus is that there simply must be a decision from the Copyright Office.25 These courts will grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
(or previously a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction) if the applicant
has only filed his or her application with the Copyright Office before bringing suit.26
One basic rationale for this approach is that in a situation in which an
owner’s application for copyright is refused, 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) still allows
for an infringement claim to be filed so long as notice is served on the Cop19.
Id. at 165.
20.
See N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Sasson, No. 2:12-3568(WJM), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1536 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2013). The courts now have jurisdiction to decide if there is a
recognizable claim. This determination is also focused on whether a copyright has been
registered by the time of the suit.
21.
Id.
22.
See, e.g., Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick, 717 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013).
23.
See N.J. Media Grp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1536.
24.
See Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1053
(C.D. Cal. 2004); Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2002).
25.
E.g., Charles F. Vatterott Constr. Co. v. Esteem Custom Homes, LLP, 686 F.
Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
26.
E.g., id.
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yright Office Register.27 Other courts adopting the registration approach
focus on the seemingly plain language of § 411.28 In addition to the plain
language of § 411, these courts will look to the surrounding sections (primarily §§ 408 and 410) for how these sections use the words “registration”
and “application.”29
Only the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have conclusively adopted the
registration approach in their circuit courts.30 Both of these circuit decisions
were rendered before the Reed Elsevier opinion from the Supreme Court,
and thus discuss the registration approach in the context of jurisdiction.31
Despite this, both circuits have reaffirmed their reasoning and belief in the
registration approach in a post-Reed Elsevier reading of § 411.32 The other
three circuits that have adopted the registration approach have only had
their decisions reach the district courts within those circuits, but there is
every indication that their circuit courts would rule in favor of the registration approach.33
A.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT: LA RESOLANA ARCHITECTS

In the Tenth Circuit case of La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors
Angel Fire, the plaintiff, an architectural firm, had drawn plans for a potential townhouse project, the Angel Fire project, in the year 1997.34 The project was ultimately abandoned.35 In 2003, an employee of the architectural
firm visited a building site of the defendant and recognized the townhouses
as similar to the ones designed for the abandoned Angel Fire project.36 Less
than a month later, the plaintiff filed a copyright for the drawings of the
townhouses from the Angel Fire project, and filed a lawsuit for copyright
infringement thirteen days after filing for a copyright.37 The court contemplated a motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs only had a letter from the
27.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (LexisNexis 2008).
28.
E.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200
(10th Cir. 2005).
29.
Id. at 1200-01.
30.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1195; M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d
1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990).
31.
M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1489; La Resolana, 416 F.3d 1195.
32.
See Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick, 717 F.3d 1112, 1119-20 (10th Cir. 2013);
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1302 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012).
33.
See, e.g., N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Sasson, No. 2:12-3568(WJM), 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1536 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2013); Hawaiian Vill. Computer, Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partners,
Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Mich. 2007); TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No.
4:06CV00697JCH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71240 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
34.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
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Copyright Office stating that the copyright was approved for registration
(which had been received nearly five months into the litigation), but a certificate of registration had not yet been issued by the Copyright Office.38
The copyright registration was to be effective the day before the initiation
of the lawsuit, as soon as the certificate of registration was finally received.39 The court eventually granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff had not satisfied the “registration” requirement of § 411.40
The court generally found that, because the registration of a copyright
is a voluntary action, which allows a party to enforce their copyright in an
infringement suit, the legislature meant to incentivize parties to register
their copyrightable material in order for that party to take advantage of the
ability to file an infringement claim.41
The court aligned itself with the registration approach based upon the
“[a]ct’s seemingly plain language.”42 It found that the statute in question
contained affirmative steps that had to be taken, by both the applicant and
the Copyright Office, before “registration” was complete.43 The court seemingly found the most important affirmative acts to be the purported requirement from §§ 410(a) and 410(b).44 Section 410(a) requires the Register
to “‘examine,’ to ‘register,’ and then to ‘issue’ the certificate of registration” before a copyright is registered,45 and § 410(b) alternatively requires
the Register to “determine[] . . . the material deposited does not constitute
copyrightable subject matter” before refusing the registration.46
While the court in La Resolana suggested that the letter the architectural firm had received from the Copyright Office (stating that the copyright
had been approved, but the certificate may be delayed) would be sufficient
for an infringement claim, the case was ultimately dismissed because the
lawsuit was brought before any such letter or affirmative response from the
Copyright Office had been received.47
As noted previously, the Tenth Circuit has impliedly upheld their
adoption of the registration approach after the Reed Elsevier decision.48
38.
Id. at 1198.
39.
La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1197-98
(10th Cir. 2005).
40.
Id. at 1208.
41.
See id. at 1199-1200.
42.
Id. at 1201.
43.
Id.
44.
See La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201
(10th Cir. 2005).
45.
Id. at 1201 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (LexisNexis 2014)).
46.
Id. at 1201 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(b) (LexisNexis 2014)).
47.
Id. at 1208.
48.
See Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick, 717 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013).
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More directly, several district courts within the Tenth Circuit have explicitly continued the use of the registration approach after 2010.49
B.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: M.G.B. HOMES

The Eleventh Circuit case of M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes also involved plans for a housing development.50 The plaintiff, M.G.B. Homes,
filed suit against the defendant, a rival homebuilder, for allegedly copying
the floor plan found on one of M.G.B.’s flyers.51 Despite the main issue
being the scope of the copyright received by M.G.B., the court did briefly
address the registration approach in all but name.52
M.G.B. filed for a copyright on May 5, 1986 but did not receive a certificate of registration until several months later on July 28, 1986.53 M.G.B.
filed a copyright infringement complaint a few weeks before receiving its
certificate of registration, on July 3, 1986.54 However, because M.G.B. had
not yet received an affirmative action from the Copyright Office at the time
of the initiation of the lawsuit, the court dismissed the case.55 M.G.B. eventually refiled the lawsuit and amended the complaint after they had received
the certificate, in order to comply with the district court’s reading of §
411.56 The Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, condoned the fact that the district
court had waited to exercise jurisdiction until M.G.B. had actually received
a certificate of registration.57 While this court did not explicitly state that it
was adopting the registration approach, a subsequent opinion,58 and many
district courts within this circuit, 59 have interpreted the language in M.G.B.
to have done exactly that. Although the subsequent decision by the circuit
court decision was decided before Reed Elsevier, at least one district court

49.
E.g., Viesti Assocs. v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 12-cv-02240-PAB-DW, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113323, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 2013); GeoSpec1 Sys., LLC v. Infrastructure Corp. of Am., No. 13-cv-00407-PAB-BNB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110519, at *10
(D. Colo. Aug. 6, 2013).
50.
M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1487 (11th Cir. 1990).
51.
Id. at 1487-88.
52.
Id. at 1488-89.
53.
Id. at 1489.
54.
Id.
55.
M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990).
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 1489-90.
58.
Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000).
59.
See, e.g., Marc Anthony Builders, Inc. v. Javic Props., LLC., No. 8:11-CV00432-EAK-AEP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74706, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2011); Kaye
Homes, Inc. v. Original Custom Homes Corp., No. 2:07-cv-392-FtM-29SPC, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60847, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2007).
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within the Eleventh Circuit has continued to uphold the registration approach precedent post-Reed Elsevier.60
C.

DISTRICT COURTS WITHIN THE SIXTH, THIRD, AND EIGHT
CIRCUITS

While the Eighth, Sixth, and Third Circuit Courts have not affirmatively made a decision to follow the registration approach, many district
courts within these circuits have begun to adopt the registration approach.
District courts in the Eighth Circuit first adopted the registration approach in 2006.61 In TVI, Inc., the court, like many other courts adopting the
registration approach, opted for a reading of the “plain language.”62 A separate district within the Eighth Circuit, previous to Reed Elsevier, also found
that the Eight Circuit would likely opt for a plain reading approach to the
statute, and favor the registration approach.63
District courts in the Sixth Circuit began to adopt the registration approach slightly before the Reed Elsevier opinion.64 The court in Hawaiian
Village Computer Inc. found that although the Sixth Circuit had declared
registration to be “a prerequisite to filing a copyright infringement suit,”65
the circuit court had not yet addressed the registration or application approaches.66 This court found that, because of the language of a prior decision, the Sixth Circuit would give considerable deference to the plain language of the statute.67 As plain language analysis is central to the registration approach, the court in Hawaiian Village determined “that the Sixth
Circuit would favor the registration approach.”68 At least one subsequent
district court decision has affirmed the analysis done by this court.69

60.
See Marc Anthony Builders, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74706, at *5.
61.
TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06cv00697JCH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71240 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006).
62.
See id.
63.
Charles F. Vatterott Constr. Co. v. Esteem Custom Homes, LLP, 686 F. Supp.
2d 934, 939 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
64.
Hawaiian Vill. Computer, Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partners, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d
951, 953-54 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Teevee Toons, Inc. v. Overture Records, 501 F. Supp. 2d
964, 967 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
65.
Hawaiian Vill. Computer, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (citing Murray Hill Publ’ns,
Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns., 264 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2001)).
66.
Hawaiian Vill. Computer, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
67.
Id. at 954. The previous case of Murray Hill from the Sixth Circuit analyzed
derivatives works under the Copyright Act. Murray Hill, 264 F.3d 622. The Hawaiian Village court chose to follow the Murray Hill court’s method of analysis, whose first step involved looking at the plain language of the statute.
68.
Hawaiian Vill. Computer, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
69.
Teevee Toons, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
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Finally, two years ago, and after the Reed Elsevier decision, district
courts in the Third Circuit began to align themselves with the registration
approach. In Patrick Collins, Inc. the court found the statute unambiguous
and opted for a plain reading of the statute.70 With little additional rationale,
the court emphatically stated that “[i]n enacting 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), Congress chose the registration approach, and we must abide by that decision.”71 In 2013, a district court within the Third Circuit again recognized
that the circuit court had yet to adopt either approach.72 This court, instead
of relying on Patrick Collins, decided to consult “case law in the Third Circuit decided post-Reed Elsevier.”73 After reviewing these cases, the court
determined that the adoption of the registration approach in the Third Circuit was likely, going so far as to say that the plaintiffs could not have a
valid claim for copyright infringement until they actually held a certificate
of copyright registration.74

IV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH
The application approach, on the other hand, posits that a claim of
copyright infringement may be brought at any point after the application
has been submitted to the Copyright Office.75 This is based upon two main
ideas. The first idea is that, because copyrights are backdated to the date of
application, plaintiffs should be able to defend themselves from infringement at any point after this date. Several courts have also pointed to the fact
that under the registration approach, the statute of limitations, coupled with
potential backlogs at the Copyright Office, could create a situation in which
a person could never defend against a clear infringement.76 The second
main reason for allowing infringement suits after an application is submitted to the Copyright Office is based on a contextual statutory analysis.
Many of these courts point to the language of surrounding sections to buttress their use of the application approach. For example, courts point to the
language of 17 U.S.C. § 408, which states that registration can be obtained

70.
Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
71.
Id.
72.
N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Sasson, No. 2:12-3568(WJM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1536, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2013).
73.
Id. at *6.
74.
See id. at *6-7. This diverges slightly from the consensus of courts adopting the
registration approach. Typically any notice by the Copyright Office that the registration is
imminent, or a certificate is forthcoming, is sufficient to show registration. See, e.g., La
Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
75.
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010).
76.
See, e.g., id. at 620.
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once a party delivers all of the relevant documents (such as the application,
fee, etc.) to the Copyright Office.77
The Ninth Circuit has most definitively adopted the application approach,78 while decisions from the Fifth79 and Seventh80 Circuits have been
interpreted to have adopted the application approach. While all of these
decisions were made before the Reed Elsevier opinion, they have since been
reaffirmed. In addition to these circuits, district courts within the First and
Fourth Circuits have sided with the application approach in the last several
years.81
A.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT: COSMETIC IDEAS V. IAC

The most thorough analysis of the application approach was done in
the Ninth Circuit case of Cosmetic Ideas. This case involved a dispute between Cosmetic and the parent company of The Home Shopping Network
(IAC) over a piece of jewelry designed by Cosmetic.82 Cosmetic began
selling the piece around 1999, and claimed that around 2005, IAC began
selling a “‘virtually identical’ necklace.”83 It was not until after IAC began
selling the alleged copy that Cosmetic filed the paperwork for a copyright
with the Copyright Office in 2008.84 Cosmetic filed suit less than two
weeks after receiving a notice from the Copyright Office that it had received the application and all of the necessary documents.85
The court first analyzed the plain language of the statute in question, §
411, because when a statute is unambiguous, there is generally no need for

77.

In relevant portion, 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) reads:
[T]he owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work
may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to
the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409
and 708. Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.
17 U.S.C. §408(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added).
78.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612.
79.
Apple Barrel Prods. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
80.
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003).
81.
Performance Sales & Mktg. LLC v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 5:07CV00140-RLVDLH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131394, at *34-35 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 14, 2012); Alicea v. Machete Music, No. 10CV30002-MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596, at *8-9 (D. Mass. Feb.
23, 2012).
82.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612.
83.
Id. at 614.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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further analysis.86 The court found the language of § 411 to be unclear as to
the implication of “registration,” and that the accompanying definitions for
Title 1787 provided even less clarification for what “registration” is meant to
entail.88 Because of this, the court then looked at the Act “as a whole,” in
order to determine the statutory intent and context.89
The court acknowledged the fact that some of the provisions, § 410(a)
and the end of § 411(a), described the actions and steps that must be undertaken by the Register of Copyrights.90 Section 410(a) states that “the Register shall register the claim and issue . . . a certificate of registration,” and §
411(a) states that when filing an infringement suit, after an application is
initially rejected, a copy must be served on the Register of Copyrights.91
While this may seem to suggest that “registration” is not effected upon the
receipt of an application, the court found that in the overall context of Title
17, the application approach more appropriately conformed to the congressional intent.92
Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that § 408 only states that a
party “may obtain registration . . . by delivering” the appropriate paperwork
to the Copyright Office.93 In addition to this, § 411(a) allows a party to file
a copyright infringement suit even if the Copyright Office rejects the copyright outright.94 Finally, the court noted that by the time of the opinion,
Cosmetic had in fact received a certificate of registration, which had an
effective date dating back to several weeks before the initiation of the lawsuit.95 Thus, for purposes of this specific lawsuit, the issue of IAC’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim had become moot.96
Despite this analysis, the court was not satisfied that “the plain language of the Act unequivocally support[ed] either the registration or application approach.”97 This led the court to do a historical and contextual anal86.
Id. at 616 (citing United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.
2009)).
87.
17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (LexisNexis 2005).
88.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616.
89.
Id. at 617.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 410(a) (LexisNexis 2014), 411(a) (LexisNexis
2008)).
92.
See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.
93.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (LexisNexis 2005)).
94.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (LexisNexis 2008).
95.
Id. at 616.
96.
The court determined that although the issue of the motion was moot, it would
still definitively decide whether to adopt the registration or application approach in the circuit. The court found that the problem presented in the case was “capable of repetition yet
evading review” as well as being an unsettled issue among the district courts within the
circuit. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616.
97.
Id. at 618.
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ysis of § 411 beginning at its inception.98 After this review, the court found
that the application approach “better fulfills Congress’s purpose of providing broad copyright protection while maintaining a robust federal register.”99
Perhaps most importantly, the leading treatise on copyrights best
summarized the policy reasons behind the court’s adoption of the application approach when it said, “[g]iven that the claimant . . . will ultimately be
allowed to proceed regardless of how the Copyright Office treats the application, it makes little sense to create a period of ‘legal limbo’ in which suit
is barred.”100
B.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: APPLE BARREL PRODUCTIONS

The Fifth Circuit, in Apple Barrel Productions, dealt with a battle between two children’s country music programs.101 The court, pre-Reed Elsevier, dispatched with the issue of when a copyright is registered with little
more than one sentence. The Apple Barrel court cited to the previously
mentioned leading treatise on copyright infringement actions,102 and simply
said, “One need only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work
in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application.”103
Several district courts within the Fifth Circuit have addressed this issue, post-Reed Elsevier, and have determined that the application approach
is still applicable within the Fifth Circuit.104 The court in Compound Stock
Earnings addressed another criticism of the application approach that is not
always as prevalent in the argument over which approach is the correct interpretation of § 411. One of the issues that the court wrestled with was
whether only requiring an application would create a situation in which a
party, with no legitimate claim to the copyrightable work or who had not
actually filed the application, could rely on the previously filed application,
and maintain an action for copyright infringement. While the likelihood of
this scenario would be rare, the court still decided to address this potential
issue of the application approach. It ultimately looked to other case law in
the circuit, and noted that courts generally review the application to ensure
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 620 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 7.16[B][1][a][i] (2008)).
101.
Apple Barrel Prods. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir. 1984).
102.
NIMMER, supra note 100.
103.
Apple Barrel Prods., 730 F.2d at 386-87.
104.
E.g., Compound Stock Earnings Seminars, Inc. v. Dannenberg, No.
3:10CV2201D, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1014 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012).

2015]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED

75

that it was filed by the party who had instituted the suit, and to perform a
preliminary analysis of the sufficiency of the application.105
C.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: A TREND TOWARDS THE
APPLICATION APPROACH

The Seventh Circuit has at worst been a circuit that flip-flops between
each approach, most recently aligning with the application approach, and at
best is a circuit which has recognized that post-Reed Elsevier, use of the
application approach is the appropriate standard.
The first major decision from the Seventh Circuit regarding the application versus registration approach debate did not come until 2003.106 Like
many other circuits, the Seventh Circuit looked to the leading treatise on
copyright for their analysis of the requirements of § 411.107 The court stated
that “an application for registration must be filed before the copyright can
be sued upon.”108
The Seventh Circuit then followed this decision, only a year later, with
a case that seemed to directly conflict with that reading.109 Curiously, the
court in Gaiman believed this question to be unanswered by Chicago Board
of Education, and determined that application alone was insufficient under
§ 411.110 The court determined that an affirmative or negative action must
be taken by the Copyright Office before a lawsuit can be brought, which is
exactly what is required under the registration approach.111
No other significant decision took place until after the decision in Reed
Elsevier, and post-Reed Elsevier only the Northern District of Illinois has
addressed this contradiction. Only one of these district court opinions,
TriTeq Lock, has found that the precedent in the Seventh Circuit requires a
following of the registration approach.112 As suggested above, the most
recent trend within the Seventh Circuit is an adoption of the application
approach. Notably, the two most recent decisions in the Seventh Circuit’s
District Courts have adopted the application approach explicitly, and not
found Gaiman or TriTeq Lock to mandate anything to the contrary.

105.
Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.
106.
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003).
107.
NIMMER, supra note 100.
108.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631.
109.
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
110.
Id. at 655.
111.
Id. The court’s exact language was that “an application to register must be filed,
and either granted or refused, before suit can be brought.” (emphasis added). Id.
112.
Triteq Lock & Sec. L.L.C. v. Innovative Secured Solutions, L.L.C., No.
10CV1304, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14147, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2012).
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First, at the beginning of 2013, the court in Leventhal v. Schenberg
specifically pointed to Chicago Board of Education and Reed Elsevier as
requiring only that the application be “filed before the copyright can be
sued upon.”113 The court found the attached letter of receipt from the Copyright Office to be sufficient to allow the litigation to proceed.114
In August of 2013, the Northern District of Illinois, in Panoramic Images, again decided to side with Chicago Board of Education and adopt the
application approach.115 This court explicitly acknowledged that Gaiman
and TriTeq Lock seemed to have adopted the registration approach within
the Seventh Circuit, but instead pointed to Leventhal and Hard Drive Productions116 for the trend of using the application approach within the circuit.117 While the Seventh Circuit court has not clarified this discrepancy
between their opinions, the trend among the district courts tends to support
an adoption of the application approach within the Seventh Circuit.118
D.

DISTRICT COURTS WITHIN THE FIRST AND FOURTH
CIRCUITS

Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the First and Fourth Circuits have
trended towards an adoption of the application approach. Additionally, the
decisions to come out of these circuits have almost entirely been rendered
after the decision in Reed Elsevier, tending to suggest that the application
approach is gaining more momentum after the Supreme Court’s opinion.
The First Circuit has discussed this issue after Reed Elsevier, but provided no guidance as to what their understanding of “registration” is.119 The
First District Court within the First Circuit to decide this issue did so in
2003.120 The court looked at §§ 408(a), 410(d), and 411(a) to determine
113.
Leventhal v. Schenberg, 917 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631).
114.
Id. at 844-45.
115.
Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 961 F. Supp. 2d 918, 927
(N.D. Ill. 2013).
116.
The case of Hard Drive Productions was decided in 2011, before TriTeq. Hard
Drive Prods. v. Doe, No. 10CV1304, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118049 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12,
2011).
117.
Panoramic Images, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
118.
It seems that the Northern District of Illinois at first decided on the application
approach (Hard Drive Productions), reversed course to the registration approach (TriTeq),
and then decided the application approach was in fact correct (Leventhal and Panoramic
Images).
119.
Airframe Sys. v. L-3 Commc’ns. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that “proof of registration” is still an element, but not providing what constitutes either
“proof” or “registration”); Latin Am. Music Co. v. Media Power Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d 34, 4243 (1st Cir. 2013) (same).
120.
Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75-78 (D.R.I. 2003).
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how the Act as a whole treated the word “registrations.”121 The court was
most persuaded by § 410(d), which states the effective date of the registration is that the date that the application was received.122 The court then
quickly chose to adopt the application approach within that district.123 Since
then, only one other district court has addressed this issue.124
Before Reed Elsevier, at least one district court within the Fourth Circuit determined that the use of the application approach was a proper reading of § 411.125 In Iconbazaar, the court looked to the history of the statute
to determine what the intent of Congress was, as well as looking at the
overall context of the provision in question (§ 411).126 Upon this analysis,
the court determined that the application approach was the best way to realize congressional intent. It also found that the plaintiff’s attached letter from
the Copyright Office, stating that they had received all appropriate documents and payments, was sufficient to show registration under § 411.127
After Reed Elsevier, one more district decided in favor of the application
approach.128 The court followed much of the same reasoning as in Iconbazaar, and recognized a trend within the district courts of the Fourth Circuit.129
Both the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have had district courts
adopt the application approach within the last two years.130 This has been
accompanied by district courts within the Seventh Circuit, in the last several
years, reversing course and again adopting the application approach.131 It
seems that these three circuits will soon align themselves with both the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ use of the application approach.

121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 77.
123.
Id.
124.
Alicea v. Machete Music, No. 10CV30002-MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22596, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2012) (declining to choose because the plaintiff would fail
to satisfy the test under both the application and registration approaches). The court noted
that Foraste might suggest a trend towards the application approach. Id.
125.
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C.
2004); see also Pure Country Weavers v. Bristar, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 439, 444 (W.D.N.C.
2006) (stating that it did not have to pick a side, but the analysis suggesting that the application approach would be acceptable).
126.
Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
127.
Id. at 634 n.3.
128.
Performance Sales & Mktg. LLC v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 5:07CV00140-RLVDLH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131394 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2012).
129.
Id. at *34-35.
130.
Alicea v. Machete Music, No. 10-CV-30002-MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22596 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2012); Performance Sales, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131394.
131.
Leventhal v. Schenberg, 917 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quoting
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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V. ANALYSIS
The above analysis and interpretation by the courts clearly indicates
that only one approach can be correct, and leaves little common ground
between the two approaches. Much like the court in Prunte, this Article
finds the application approach to be the correct interpretation and “joins
Judge Kennedy, the leading copyright treatise, and those courts that have
held that an infringement suit may be brought when a copyright application
is completed and submitted to the United States Copyright Office.”132 The
analysis that follows will further elaborate the reasoning for the application
approach being the correct interpretation and application of § 411.
This analysis will first discuss the issues and flaws present in the reasoning of the courts adopting the registration approach, followed by the
justifications for a “plain language” analysis leading to an adoption of the
application approach, and finally why, if a plain language analysis alone is
not persuasive, the application approach is still the appropriate interpretation of § 411.
A.

WHY THE REGISTRATION APPROACH IS THE IMPROPER
INTERPRETATION OF § 411

The Eleventh Circuit was the first Circuit court to adopt the registration approach.133 In 1990, when it was decided, the question was approached as solely a jurisdictional question due to the decision being rendered pre-Reed Elsevier.134 This circuit court performed little analysis of the
statute in question other than determining that previous case law required
“registration,” which is now recognized as a somewhat ambiguous term in
the Copyright Act.135 The court then ratified the lower court’s finding that a
party must have the certificate of registration in-hand in order to file a copyright infringement suit.136 The Eleventh Circuit, and the district courts
within that Circuit, have yet to provide insight into how and why the decision to follow the registration approach was made; as well as why this cursory analysis should still be applicable almost twenty-five years later.
The only circuit court to provide their analysis before adopting the registration approach was the Tenth Circuit.137 The analysis of this specific
decision will be particularly scrutinized due to the prevalence of its reason132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
2005).

Prunte v. Universal Music Grp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2007).
M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1488-89 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1489.
La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir.

2015]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED

79

ing in other opinions that have adopted the registration approach and proponents of such an approach. The reasoning of this particular opinion also
deserves heightened exploration because of the serious weight that this reasoning is given when arriving at a conclusion in favor of registration in
other courts throughout the United States.138 The Tenth Circuit adopted the
registration approach by supposedly using the “plain language” of the provision in question (§ 411).139 However, the court’s “plain reading” of the
language contained in § 411 ventured into an analysis of other sections of
the Copyright Act, particularly § 410.140 This court, when venturing into
other sections, failed to recognize that these sections did not purport to be
for the purpose of analyzing when a civil infringement claim may be
brought. 141 This is in stark contrast to § 411 of the Copyright Act, which is
explicitly entitled “Registration and civil infringement actions,” and meant
to be consulted for purposes of these issues.142
The court encountered this exact problem when trying to use § 410 to
support the choice of the registration approach. It determined that § 410(a),
which states that the Copyright Office can issue a “Certificate of Registration” after reviewing the submitted material,143 suggested that the submission of the application materials and the point of registration are two separate events.144 However, this court then partially undermined its reasoning
by acknowledging that § 411 (the provision in question) does not contain
any reference to a “certificate” when discussing the requirements for bringing a copyright infringement suit.145 Based upon this, the Tenth Circuit’s
use of § 410 to justify its interpretation of § 411 seems to be, at best, misguided.
Much like other courts adopting the registration approach, the Tenth
Circuit then suggested two different policy rationales for interpreting the
138.
E.g., TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06CV00697JCH, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71240 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006); Nathan R. Curtis, Note, Statutory Cosmetic Surgery: Misinterpretation of the Copyright Act's Registration Requirement in Cosmetic Ideas,
Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 2011 BYU L. REV. 83 (2011).
139.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202.
140.
Id. at 1203.
141.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (LexisNexis 2008).
142.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (LexisNexis 2008).
143.
17 U.S.C. § 410(a) reads:
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material deposited constitutes copyrightable
subject matter and that the other legal and formal requirements
of this title have been met, the Register shall register the claim
and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under the
seal of the Copyright Office.
17 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (LexisNexis 2014).
144.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203.
145.
Id.
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statute as it had done. The first reason was that Congress had “created significant incentives” for an owner to copyright their material, and that this
was a carrot-and-stick approach to coax the owner into copyrighting their
work.146 The court declared that this carrot-and-stick rationale was paramount to the underwriting of this statute.147 Despite claiming that its rationale was founded upon the “plain meaning” of the statute, this court as
well as many others, without any citation to legislative intent, decided that
the congressional intent of § 411 was to use it as a “‘carrot’ to induce registration.”148 While La Resolona Architects as well as several other cases did
spend a portion of their opinions addressing several of the amendments,
they have not gleaned any meaningful intent from the actual legislature
itself.149
As many cases adopting the registration approach have simply stated
that they agree with the statutory history analysis done in La Resolana Architects, some deconstruction of the specific steps taken in that part of the
analysis is appropriate. La Resolana Architects first pointed to a 1988
amendment in which Congress sought to align United States law with an
international convention known as the Berne Convention.150 Because Congress, instead of rewriting the entirety of Title 17 to comply with this new
convention, simply placed an exception in § 411,151 the court interpreted
this to mean that Congress intended “registration” to be required for all
domestic suits.152 This exception was meant to ensure that foreign works
did not have to undergo the formalities required by United States law, as it
was in conflict with a main objective of the Berne Convention that formalities (such as registration) would not be a prerequisite for a work to be copyrighted.153 The court in La Resolana suggested that by not exempting domestic works from “registration” under § 411, Congress had expressed their
intent that domestic works would still be required to receive actual notice of
registration before a copyright owner could pursue infringement actions.154
This, however, begs the question. To find that not exempting domestic
146.
Id. at 1204-05.
147.
Id.
148.
E.g., La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1204-05; TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No.
4:06cv00697JCH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71240, at *16 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006); Charles
F. Vatterott Constr. Co. v. Esteem Custom Homes, LLP, 686 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (E.D.
Mo. 2010).
149.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205
150.
Id.
151.
At the time the exception read: “[E]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United States . . . .” 17
U.S.C.A. § 411 (LexisNexis 2008).
152.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206.
153.
Id. at 1205-06.
154.
Id.
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works requires use of the registration approach presupposes that the registration approach is in fact the correct interpretation of the word “registration.” The interpretation of this word, and its surrounding language, is fundamental to the debate between the two approaches.155 Nothing in the legislative history of the 1988 amendment indicates that congressional action
was meant to help alleviate these starkly conflicting approaches throughout
its inaction.156
The Tenth Circuit then pointed to opportunities in 1993 and 2005 to
remove the word “registration,” where the language was ultimately left
in.157 This analysis, cited by many courts adopting the registration approach, does nothing to further the debate over the definition of “registration” or show the intent of congress in this respect. While it is true that the
federal courts must interpret statutes to “give effect to the intent of Congress,”158 implicit in this charge is the principle that that courts shall not
manufacture policy rationales which are not shown to be the intent of Congress.159 Although the court found that “Congress . . . took up the question
of whether to eliminate registration as a prerequisite to filing suit for infringement” and did not adopt either of the amendments,160 inaction by
Congress should not be interpreted to be an affirmation of one interpretation of a present ambiguity. As a recent study by the Brookings Institute has
shown, the last three congressional sessions (110th-112th) have concluded
with fewer than twelve percent of the total bills introduced eventually becoming law.161 During the 100th congressional session, which declined to
adopt the amendments suggested to be important by La Resolana, the passage rate was slightly higher at 16.9%.162 Still, with passage rates well below twenty percent, failure to adopt an amendment should not be pointed to
as definitive congressional intent for that statute. Additionally, the differing
interpretation of the application and registration approach existed at the

155.
Supra notes 8-11.
156.
See La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206.
157.
Id.
158.
TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06cv00697JCH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71240, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (quoting United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th
Cir. 2000)).
159.
See id.
160.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206.
161.
BROOKINGS INST.,Vital Statistics on Congress, Chapter 6: Legislative Productivity
in
Congress
and
Workload,
Table
6-1,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/07/vital%20statistics%20co
ngress%20mann%20ornstein/Vital%20Statistics%20Chapter%206%20%20Legislative%20P
roductivity%20in%20Congress%20and%20Workload_UPDATE.pdf (last updated Apr. 18,
2014).
162.
Id.
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time of these proposed amendments.163 Congress’ failure to change the language of a statute that was contemporaneously being interpreted in two
different manners should clearly not be viewed as congressional support for
either of the approaches.
While eventually siding with the registration approach, the court in
Patrick Collins clearly acknowledged that its “own policy views do not
give [it] license to rewrite an unambiguous statute.”164 Although this court’s
view of the statute is in conflict with this Article’s position, this court correctly recognized that policy rationales should not be the main purpose for
the adoption of either of the approaches.165
Although several courts have relied heavily on policy reasons for
adopting the registration approach, still more have focused on the plain
language of the statute. The real problem with adopting the registration
approach based on this rationale is the analysis that is done while looking at
the “plain language” of § 411.
B.

WHY THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS THE CORRECT
“PLAIN LANGUAGE” ANALYSIS OF § 411

Almost universally, courts determining whether the application or registration approach is appropriate discuss the “plain language” of § 411. The
analysis of the plain language of § 411 strays to other sections under both
approaches. The Supreme Court has deemed plain language analysis appropriate for statutory construction when an ambiguous term can be clarified in
the broader context of the statute.166 Statutory construction such as this is a
“holistic endeavor.”167 However, “[w]hen examining statutory language, the
court should generally give words their ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning.”168 The sections of the Copyright Act that are typically consulted to better understand the meaning of “registration” within § 411 are
163.
See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir.
1990); Apple Barrel Prods. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
164.
Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 843 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
165.
See id.
166.
A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme--because the
same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its
meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the
rest of the law.
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)
(internal citation omitted).
167.
Id.
168.
Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F.Supp.2d 362, 368 (2005) (citing Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)).
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§§ 408-412.169 However, the majority of the focus is spent on §§ 408, 410,
and other parts of 411.170
The usefulness of § 410 (specifically § 410(a))171 can be dispatched
with most easily. Proponents of the registration approach point to § 410(a)
for the idea that affirmative action must be taken by the Copyright Office in
order to effect registration.172 However, as the Iconbazaar court noted, there
is no suggestion that § 410(a) is meant to impose limitations on the institution of a copyright infringement claim.173 Part (a) only discusses when a
certificate of registration may be issued to the applicant, and is placed in the
Act so that the Register of Copyrights’ ultimate determination about the
application is required in order to issue that certificate.174
Perhaps the only pertinent part of § 410 would be subpart (d).175 As
noted by several courts, this section could be used in support of either approach.176 The most succinct explanation of how this section supports both
approaches comes from the Ninth Circuit.177
Because this subsection dates a later-approved registration as of the date of its application, it supports
the interpretation that application is the critical
event [supporting the application approach]. However, because this back-dating does not occur until
after the Copyright Office or a court has deemed
the registration acceptable, the statute could be
read to require action by the Register to effect registration [supporting the registration approach].178

169.
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010).
170.
Id.
171.
This subsection instructs the Register of Copyrights to issue a “certificate of
registration” upon a finding that all legal and formal requirements are met by the materials
that has been submitted for copyright registration. 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (LexisNexis 2014).
172.
See, e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195,
1201 (10th Cir. 2005); Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002).
173.
“[T]his statute could be read to apply only to the requirements for issuance of a
registration certificate, not to the requirements for instituting an action for infringement.”
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004)
174.
17 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (LexisNexis 2014); see Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at
634.
175.
“The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court
of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the
Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(d) (LexisNexis 2014).
176.
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2010).
177.
Id.
178.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Regardless of which approach uses this subsection as support, the end
result is still that the copyright registration date will be backdated to when
the application was accepted by the Copyright Office. Due to the registration date being that of the receipt of the application, a party is entitled to file
suit against any infringement that has taken place on the date of the application or forward. This should be seen to bolster the position of the application approach because the registration approach would create a sort of deadtime after the effective date of registration but before receipt of the registration certificate. Infringements during this dead-time can ultimately be litigated, but the copyright holder must likely wait in excess of eight months to
take any action if one subscribes to the registration approach. Despite this,
some courts have still found that this section can be “read in two ways”179
and does not “unequivocally support”180 either approach. To address this,
courts will sometimes continue to look to other sections for the broader
context of this statute.181
Addressing the broader context of the statue, § 408 helps to show why
the application approach is the most appropriate interpretation of § 411;182
specifically, § 408(a).183 As noted previously, “If the statute is unambiguous
and if the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, [the] inquiry ends
there.”184 This section clearly states that registration of a copyright claim
can be obtained by delivering the application with the appropriate fees.185 It
should be reiterated that the ultimate question is at what point “Registration
of the copyright claim”186 is made, for purposes of filing an infringement
claim under § 411. This language in § 408(a) would seem to end the inquiry, but still courts march forward in their analysis.
Lastly, courts will look to the surrounding language of § 411(a). Section 411(a) provides an applicant the opportunity to file an infringement
suit even if the application was rejected.187 Some courts which adopt the
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
E.g., Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
See Iconbazaar, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
In relevant part, this section reads:
[T]he owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work
may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to
the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409
and 708. Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.
17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
184.
Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 368 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting
Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2003)).
185.
17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
186.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (emphasis added).
187.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (LexisNexis 2008):
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registration approach find that the backdating done under § 410(d) is sufficient to satisfy any unfair prejudice that would result by having to wait to
file an infringement suit, because regardless of the outcome a suit may
eventually be filed.188 Additionally, some courts have found this mechanism
in § 411(a), which requires notice of the suit be provided to the Copyright
Office, to merely be a chance for the Copyright Office to defend their ultimate denial of the copyright.189 Specifically, courts have looked to a Senate
report for the idea that this ability to file a claim after copyright rejection
“merely provides . . . the [Copyright] Office . . . a second opportunity to
express its views on the claim's validity . . . .”190 Because of this, § 411(a)
should not be interpreted as merely another mechanism through which an
applicant may institute an infringement suit after waiting months for a decision from the Copyright Office, as some courts have suggested.191 Instead
this provision is merely a safeguard which allows the applicant to challenge
the validity of the Copyright Office’s rejection without having to postpone
the owners copyright infringement litigation, and potentially ultimately
forfeiting any damages they may receive.192
During statutory interpretation, in addition to analyzing individual sections, the Supreme Court has continually stated that laws must be given a
“sensible construction” and that an application “which would lead to absurd
consequences, should be avoided whenever a reasonable application can be
given to it . . . .”193 As mentioned in the introduction, construction of § 411
in accordance with the registration approach has the potential to lead to an
absurd consequence as a result of following the approach.
The statute of limitations for an infringement action is three years,194
but a suit cannot be brought until it is registered.195 Conceivably, a situation
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee
required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the
applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement
if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the
Register of Copyrights.
188.
See Mays & Assocs., 370 F. Supp. 2d 362.
189.
Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 564 F.3d 804, 806-07 (2009). This
analysis by registration approach courts undermines their own idea that the applicant can file
an infringement suit regardless of the outcome, as long as they wait for a decision. This
reasoning suggests that filing an infringement suit after denial is a ‘last ditch effort,’ and not
simply a situation in which the applicant has to wait to file their claim, as suggested by the
court.
190.
Id. at 807 (citing S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 14 n.2 (1988)).
191.
Id. at 806-07.
192.
S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 14 n.2 (1988); see supra notes 2-3.
193.
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926).
194.
17 U.S.C.A. § 507(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
195.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (LexisNexis 2008).
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could arise under the registration approach in which an owner could not
protect their copyrightable materials because registration could be so delayed that an owner would not have time to institute an infringement action.196 If “registration” is not effected until a certificate of registration is
received, the owner must wait on the Copyright Office and the delays of the
federal government. If application affects the registration, the owner is not
punished for the backlogs and stalemates within the federal government. As
there is a reasonable application of § 411 which would not result in this
absurd outcome, the application approach more appropriately follows the
Supreme Court’s methods of statutory construction.197
C.

WHY THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS THE CORRECT
ANALYSIS OF § 411 EVEN IF A PLAIN LANGUAGE
APPROACH IS UNSATISFACTORY

Even if a court were not persuaded by the plain language of § 411 and
its surrounding sections, the application approach is still the most appropriate approach to align with the congressional intent of § 411. In statutory
construction, if plain language analysis is inconclusive, legislative intent is
an appropriate place to look for clarification.198
This argument is not purely academic, as several courts have found the
plain language of the statute inconclusive or unconvincing, yet have still
made ultimate findings as to which approach is appropriate.199 The court in
Performance Sales stated that § 411(a), because of the existence of §
410(d), is ambiguous.200 This court then determined that the congressional
intent was not to place the owner in “legal limbo” while the Copyright Of-

196.
See Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634
(M.D.N.C. 2004); supra note 4 and accompanying text. While the delay in an affirmative
action by the Copyright Office may be one source of problems, the filing of an infringement
suit in practice also requires several information gathering and preparatory steps before the
suit is actually filed. Even if the action by the Copyright Offices does not take the full three
years, a delay near three years may, in practice, prevent recovery of damages from infringers.
197.
See Katz, 271 U.S. at 357.
198.
The Court in Katz stated that a court could look to the “legislative scheme or
plan by which the general purpose of the act is to be carried out[,]” in order to ascertain the
appropriate application of the statute. Katz, 271 U.S. at 357.
199.
See, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618 (9th
Cir. 2010); Performance Sales & Mktg. LLC v. Lowe’s Cos., No. 5:07CV00140-RLV-DLH,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131394, at *33 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2012).
200.
Performance Sales, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131394, at *33. Section 410(d) says
“The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit,
and fee . . . have all been received in the Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C.A. 410(d) (LexisNexis
2014).
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fice reviewed the application.201 This court also found the application approach to be the best policy because “the Copyright Office typically registers approximately ninety-eight to ninety-nine percent of claims submitted
to it.”202
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit was “not persuaded that the plain language
of the Act unequivocally supports either the registration or application approach.”203 However, this court noted that a needless delay is presented by
the registration approach due to the fact that a party is allowed to litigate a
claim for copyright infringement regardless of whether the Copyright Office ultimately rejects the application.204 It noted that “legal limbo” can be
avoided by subscribing to the application approach.205 Additionally, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that many of the courts adopting the registration
approach confess that “construing the statute this way leads to an inefficient
and peculiar result.”206 The Ninth Circuit Court in Cosmetic seemed to, at
worst, suggest that both approaches were appropriate interpretations of §
411, but because of the “legal limbo” presented by the registration approach, the application approach was the best choice to align with congressional intent.207 Based upon the systematic rejection of arguments made by
courts adopting the registration approach, this court seems to have determined definitively that the application approach is the only logical result
because it “best effectuate[s] the interests of justice and promote[s] judicial
economy.”208

VI. CONCLUSION
While the issue of when a copyright infringement claim can be filed
has been an issue with diverging conclusions for some time, it has become a
larger issue in recent times. The number of circuits (or district courts within
those circuits) deciding these issues as a case of first impression is now
occurring at a staggering rate. More importantly, since the 2010 Supreme
Court decision in Reed Elsevier, more courts have chosen to align themselves with the application approach than the registration approach.
201.
Performance Sales, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131394, at *34.
202.
Id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 100).
203.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618.
204.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 410(a) (LexisNexis 2014); id. at 619.
205.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620.
206.
Id. (citing Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 1998)); see
also Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 EDL, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15321, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002); Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc.,
315 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
207.
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619-22.
208.
See id. at 621 (quoting Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers
of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The courts that have adopted the registration approach have first done
so in: 1990,209 2005,210 2006,211 2007,212 and 2013.213 Only one Circuit has
chosen to adopt the registration approach post-Reed Elsevier.214 While the
remainder of the Circuits that adopted the registration approach before Reed
Elsevier have continued to follow the precedent within the circuit, the
Eighth Circuit has not rendered a decision which would indicate if it will
continue to follow the registration approach.215
In direct contrast to this, circuits adopting the application approach for
the first time have done so in: 1984,216 2004,217 2010,218 2012,219 and
2013.220 Three of the five circuits have chosen to adopt the application approach post-Reed Elsevier. Similar to those courts that adopted the registration approach before 2010, all of the circuits which adopted the application
approach before Reed Elsevier have since reaffirmed their approach.221
Of the circuits that have weighed in to the discussion post-Reed Elsevier, a clear majority (a three-to-one ratio) have subscribed to the application approach. This suggests that as copyright law is brought into the twenty-first century, and as courts take a more thorough look at § 411(a), the
application approach is becoming more heavily favored.
As more circuit courts (and not simply their district courts with each
circuit) take a definitive stance on this issue, the Supreme Court will likely
have to address this issue; unlike how the Court sidestepped a decision on
the two approaches in Reed Elsevier. While there seems to be a near-even
209.
M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron Homes, 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990).
210.
La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir.
2005).
211.
TVI, Inc. v. InfoSoft Techs., Inc., No. 4:06CV00697JCH, 2006 WL 2850356
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2006).
212.
Hawaiian Vill. Computer, Inc. v. Print Mgmt. Partners, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d
951 (E.D. Mich 2007).
213.
N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Sasson, No. 2:12-3568(WJM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1536 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2013).
214.
Id.
215.
While the Eight Circuit did render an opinion in 2010 stating that it would continue to follow the registration approach, this was before the final decision was issued for
Reed Elsevier. Charles F. Vatterott Constr. Co. v. Esteem Custom Homes, LLP, 686 F.
Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
216.
Apple Barrel Prods. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
217.
Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C.
2004).
218.
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2010).
219.
Alicea v. Machete Music, No. 10CV30002-MAP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22596, (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2012).
220.
Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 961 F. Supp. 918, (N.D.
Ill. 2013); Leventhal v. Schenberg, 917 F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2013).
221.
The 2010 decision of Cosmetic was rendered after Reed Elsevier, thus has not
needed to be reaffirmed.
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division among the circuits, the trend of recent decisions provide credence
to the conclusion that the application approach is the most correct application of the congressional intent for § 411.
When not bound by precedent with their respective circuits, courts
should take note of the extensive history and argument levied by proponents of each approach. Construing § 411 and its surrounding sections pursuant to the appropriate judicial methods should result in a clear shift towards adoption of the application approach. A continued surge in courts
deciding these cases as an issue of first impression should begin to put more
pressure on the Supreme Court to once again address this issue. If the current trend holds true, and the Supreme Court does not sidestep the issue
again, the next few years should finally yield guidance from the Supreme
Court clearly adopting the application approach.

